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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1532
___________
NORMAN SHELTON,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN BLEDSOE; A. W. YOUNG; CAPTAIN TRATE; S.I.A. PERRIN; S.I.S.
LIEUTENANT HEATH; LT. SCAMPONE; LT. EDENGER, LT; A. W. HUDSON; LT.
HARPER; LT. HEPNER; LT. JOHNSON; C/O ZEIDER; C/O GRENOT;
C/O HUMMER; C/O WHITTAKER; C/O WERT; C/O HORNBURGER; C/O
STUGARD; C/O BUFF; C/O CAMBEE; C/O MUFFAT; C/O CARPENTER;
COORDINATOR NEVIL; MAILROOM SUPERVISOR OLSHESKIE; MEDICAL
LADISTIC; FRANCIS FASCIANA, MLP; C/O WEBB; BERKOSKI, CASE
MANAGER; C/O VEGH; C/O HAMILTON; C/O DEITZ; CASE MANAGER
HAMILTON; RAUP, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; GALLETA, LIEUTENANT;
POTTER, MEDICAL EXAMINER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-11-cv-00368)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 13, 2013
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 23, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________

PER CURIAM
Norman N. Shelton, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.1 For the following
reasons, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment on Shelton’s excessive use of
force claim and remand for further proceedings.
I.
The facts being well-known to the parties, we set forth only those that are
pertinent to this opinion. On August 30, 2009, Shelton was placed in a cell with another
inmate, Graham, despite Shelton’s protestations that “it wouldn’t work out” between
them. (Dkt. No. 74, p. 3.) After Shelton was handcuffed during a cell rotation, Graham
assaulted Shelton by punching his face and kicking his body. (Id.) Shelton alleged that
the prison officers did not intervene for “a whole three minutes.” (Id.) Then, according
to Shelton, Officers Raup and Whittaker, with Lieutenant Heath, entered the cell,
“slammed” him to the ground while his hands were “cuffed behind his back,” and
sprayed his face with pepper spray. (Id.)
Shelton alleged that Lieutenant Heath “intentionally and purposefully” cut off his
breathing by placing her knee on the back of his neck. (Id. p. 4.) He also claimed that
Officers Raup and Whittaker punched and kicked his face and body while he was

1

Shelton initially named thirty-two defendants in his complaint. After he filed an
amended complaint, only claims against Officer Whittaker, Lieutenant Heath, Officer
Raup, Lieutenant Galletta, and Medical Examiner Potter (collectively, “the Defendants”)
remained in the case. (Dkt. No. 74, p. 4.)
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handcuffed and lying on the floor of the cell. (Id.) According to Shelton, when he told
the officers that he could not breathe and that the pepper spray was burning his face,
Officer Raup said, “[W]e want you to suffer. [W]e [don’t] care if you can breath[e].”
(Id.) Based on these events, Shelton alleged that the Defendants used excessive force
against him, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. p. 3.)
Shelton and the Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt.
Nos. 96, 104.) Shelton submitted his own sworn affidavits as evidence to support the
facts alleged in his amended complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 47 and 127, Ex. 1.) The Defendants
also submitted a sworn affidavit, describing the August 30, 2009, incident as follows:
Records indicate that Officers Raup and Whittaker were conducting cell
rotations on August 30, 2009. [Shelton] submitted to restraints in order to
be moved to another cell. Before [Graham] could be placed in restraints he
started to assault [Shelton]. The officer called for assistance and repeatedly
ordered the assailant to cease all actions. Upon arrival of additional staff
the assault was discontinued and the assailant submitted to restraints. As
the assailant was being removed from the cell [Shelton] charged the
assailant and attempted to kick him. One of the lieutenants who responded
to the incident deployed a two second burst of MK-09 OC [pepper spray] to
the facial area of [Shelton] in an attempt to stop the assault. [Shelton] was
ordered to lay on the ground but refused. . . . Staff entered the cell and
placed [Shelton] on the ground.
(Dkt. No. 124, Ex. 3 ¶ 5.)
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all of
Shelton’s claims. (Dkt. No. 138.) As to Shelton’s excessive use of force claim, the
District Court stated that Shelton provided “no evidence” to support a conclusion that the
use of force against him “was anything other than staff using the minimal amount of
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force necessary to regain control of him.” Shelton v. Bledsoe, No. 4:CV-11-0368, 2012
WL 485067, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2012). Shelton timely filed a notice of appeal.
(Dkt. No. 139.)
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. Giles v. Kearney, 571
F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all inferences in that
party’s favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
When considering an excessive use of force claim, a district court must consider
whether force was applied in a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1992). Courts look to several factors when making this determination, including (1) the
need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the
safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by prison officials; and (5) any
efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 321 (1986); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000).
Shelton’s appeal is limited to two issues. The first is whether the District Court, in
granting summary judgment to the Defendants on his excessive force claim, “improperly
4

decided disputed factual issues.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 1, 5.) The second is whether his
“factual allegations” raised a “material issue” under the Eighth Amendment. (Id. p. 6.)
The Appellees respond that Shelton’s affidavit “did not create material factual disputes
regarding his excessive use of force claim.” (Appellees’ Br. p. 25.)
We turn our attention to the Whitley factors, in particular, the need for the
application of force and the relationship between that need and the amount of force that
was used. 475 U.S. at 321. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants after determining that Shelton had not provided any evidence that the force
used against him was anything other than the “minimal amount” needed to regain control
of him after he was attacked by Graham. Shelton, 2012 WL 485067, at *10. The District
Court discounted Shelton’s affidavits, finding that they “merely reiterate[d] those
allegations contained” in his amended complaint, and that he needed to “go beyond [the]
pleadings and provide some evidence” showing that there was a genuine issue for trial.2
Id.
Shelton’s sworn affidavits, which described the amount of force used by the
Appellees, did just that. (Dkt. Nos. 47 and 127, Ex. 1.) Affidavits are an admissible form
of evidence used to support factual positions during summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.

2

The District Court relied on Jones v. UPS, 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000).
That, however, was a counseled employment discrimination case where the plaintiff had
the burden of demonstrating that he had a disability before he could proceed to trial.
Needless to say, it has little persuasive value here.
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56(c). We have consistently said that a pro se inmate, like Shelton, “is in a decidedly
difficult position from which to generate record evidence” and that affidavits “are about
the best that can be expected” at the summary judgment stage. Brooks, 204 F.3d at 108
n.7 (quoting Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1265 (4th Cir. 1994)(Hall, J.,
dissenting)(internal punctuation omitted)); see also Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641,
649 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002). The District Court should have considered Shelton’s affidavits as
evidence with respect to his excessive use of force claim.
Had it done so, it would have been apparent that there was a dispute of material
fact as to whether Shelton was resisting the officers at the point when Lieutenant Heath
cut off his breathing by putting her knee to his neck, and when the officers kicked and
punched him and told him that they wanted to see him suffer. The Defendants did not
deny that those events occurred. (Dkt. No. 124, Ex. 3.) Even the Appellees recognize the
disputed issue, stating, “[a]dmittedly, Shelton stated that one officer put her knee on his
neck and three other officers struck him when he was on the floor while he was
handcuffed . . . .”3 (Appellees’ Br. p. 25.) Were a jury to believe Shelton’s testimony
that he was assaulted by the officers while he was fully restrained on the ground, with his
hands cuffed behind his back, it may conclude that the force used was excessive under

3

The Appellees go on to say that Shelton does not “address the context of these
events” as required by Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, but that case does not stand for the
proposition that some “context” could exist to excuse such actions by prison officials.
Rather, Whitley instructs that, if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, supports “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain,” the
case should go to the jury. Id.
6

the circumstances. See, e.g., Giles, 571 F.3d at 327 (correctional officer defendants not
entitled to qualified immunity on excessive use of force claim where plaintiff “testified
that he was hit and kicked while restrained on the ground, after he ceased to resist”);
Mensinger, 293 F.3d at 649 (“Punching and kicking someone who is handcuffed behind
his back … is repugnant to the conscience of mankind, absent the extraordinary
circumstances necessary to justify that kind of force.”) (citation omitted); Brooks, 204 F.
3d at 106 (while some force may have been necessary to “reign in” inmate’s overtime
telephone call, his being shackled at the time greatly diminished the extent of threat to
staff).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Shelton, we conclude that
there was a genuine issue of material fact at least as to the need for the application of
force and the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used by the
Defendants during the August 30, 2009 incident. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.
Summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on Shelton’s excessive use of force claim
was therefore inappropriate.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order, entered February 14, 2012,
will be reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on
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Shelton’s excessive use of force claim will be reversed. We will affirm the District
Court’s order in all other respects.4 All pending motions are denied.

4

Shelton did not raise any other issues in his opening brief and we will therefore
deem them waived. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).
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